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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
portant, but, nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included. It is
hoped that the Survey nonetheless accomplishes its basic purpose, viz.,
to key the practitioner to significant developments in the procedural
law of New York.
ARTICLE 1 - SHORT TIT=E, APPLICABILITY AND DEFINITIONS
CPLR 105(j): Age of majority changed to eighteen.
The Legislature has added a new subdivision (j) to CPLR 105.
This subdivision defines the words "infant" and "infancy" when used
within the context of the CPLR. Under the new definitions, an infant
is one who has not yet attained the age of eighteen.'
ARTICLE 2- LIMITATIONS OF TIME
CPLR 214: Tort statute of limitations adopted for strict products lia-
bility.
The scope of recovery for personal injury and property damage
caused by a defective product has been greatly expanded since Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co.2 eliminated the requirement of privity in
negligence actions. Although this right of recovery predicated upon
negligence is well settled, it may provide inadequate protection in cer-
tain instances." Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals has seen fit
I N.Y. Sass. LAWs [1974], ch. 924, § 1 (McKinney).
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 INN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
8 Recovery predicated upon a negligence theory may be had only if the following
elements can be proven: (1) the plaintiff is within the category of persons to whom the
manufacturer owes a duty of reasonable care, see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916); (2) the manufacturer did not use such care; and (3) the
negligently caused defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See W. PnossER,
LAw op ToPrs 143, 641 (Hornbook ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROssER]. The plaintiff
may rely on res ipsa loquitur as an aid in proving negligence, but such proof may be
difficult, or even impossible, particularly where a manufacturer can demonstrate that he
generally used reasonable care throughout the manufacturing process. Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 612 INs. L.J. 141, 142 (1974). See also Velez v.
Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1978)
(per curiam) (plaintiff's suit dismissed in negligence but upheld on the theory of strict
products liability); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.YS.2d 461
(1973), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 48 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 616 (1974) (jury found
manufacturer free from negligence, but rendered verdict for the plaintiff on the theory
of extended breach of warranty).
An even greater burden is imposed upon a plaintiff choosing, instead, to rely on the
traditional cause of action for breach of warranty. He must prove: (I) contractual privity
between himself and the seller; (2) the contract contained express or implied warranties
not effectively disdaimed; (3) the defect causing the injury was a breach of the warranty;
and (4) the defect proximately caused the injury. See N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (McKinney
1964). Broad disdaimers and adherence to privity requirements serve to limit the effective-
ness of these Code provisions in protecting the consumer.
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to afford greater protection to the public by extending the causes of
action for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for use beyond the traditional privity barrier.4 While achieving
necessary practical results, such attempts have resulted in much con-
fusion6 in the law of products liability since the extended breach of
warranty action, though rooted historically in contract law, has evolved
to the point where an injured party can recover despite the absence of
any relationship whatsoever to the contract of sale.6 Further confusion
has resulted from the apparent similarities between the extended breach
The extended breach of warranty action, though still developing, see note 6 infra,
provides more effective redress. Unlike the actions in negligence and true breach of war-
ranty, it eliminates the privity requirement and dispenses with the need to prove negli-
gence.
The courts have extended the breach of warranty action in personal injury cases to
the point where it is all but indistinguishable from strict products liability as to the
elements of the cause of action. See note 25 infra; see also Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). The crucial difference between
the two actions is, however, that strict liability, if given all the concomitants of a tort
action, can afford far greater advantages to a plaintiff. For example, in Rivera v. Berkeley
Super Wash, Inc., 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974), discussed in
notes 27-39 and accompanying text infra, the cause of action in extended breach of
warranty was dismissed as time-barred under the contract statute of limitations, but the
action in strict products liability was upheld under the tort statute.
4 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.YS.2d 592 (1963); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39
(1961).
5The use of the extended breach of warranty action to compensate the public has
been characterized as replete with "undesirable complications, and.., more trouble than
it is worth." PaossER, supra note 2, at 658.
6 Until relatively modem times, the New York Court of Appeals had required privity
of contract to maintain an action for breach of warranty. See Turner v. Edison Storage
Battery Co., 248 N.Y. 73, 161 N.E. 423 (1928); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139
N.E. 576 (1923). The first major breakthrough came with Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d
195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961), which extended the seller's warranty on
consumer goods to cover all members of the purchaser's household. This decision was
later embodied in section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The Court in
Goldberg v. Kolisman Instruments Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963), aliowed recovery for wrongful death against the manufacturer of an airplane but
not against the manufacturer of the defective component which had caused the accident.
By allowing the action on behalf of a passenger, the Court thus extended breach of
warranty protection to all foreseeable users. See also Rooney v. S.A. Healy Co., 20
N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 583, 281 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967); Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.,
305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953). Later, the Court sustained recovery by a rescuer of a
person endangered by a defective product on the tort doctrine that "danger invites rescue."
The Court stated that the doctrine applies where one, by his culpable act, has placed
another in a position of peril, whether the act be characterized as negligence or breach of
warranty. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 464, 255 N.E.2d 173, 175,
306 N.Y.S.2d 942, 944-45 (1969). Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), has been interpreted even by those advocating its narrowest con-
struction to expand breach of warranty to include bystanders. See note 18 infra.
It is now well settled, therefore, that breach of warranty has no privity requirement
in personal injury actions. The injured plaintiff need not have any relationship whatso-
ever to the contract of sale, and need not allege a contract as part of his cause of action.
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of warranty action, sounding in contract, and the action of strict pro-
ducts liability, sounding in tort.
In its traditional form, a warranty is a "statement or representation
made by the seller of goods, contemporaneously with and as part of the
contract of sale, though collateral to the express object of it, having
reference to the character, quality, or title of the goods... .-7 The mea-
sure of damages obtainable in a contract action for breach of warranty
is the difference between the value of the goods as accepted and their
value had they been as represented.8 Consequential damages, including
injury to person or property resulting from the breach, are governed by
contract law and, accordingly, are relegated to a secondary status.9
The extended breach of warranty action,'0 a hybrid of tort and
contract law, is sufficiently removed from contract law concepts to make
use of the term "warranty" misleading. A contract of sale is unnecessary,
the legal fiction of implied warranty supplying the premise upon which
a suit for breach is based."' In utilizing this cause of action, the Court
of Appeals has been inconsistent in its application of proper legal princi-
ples. While sustaining warranty actions for wrongful death' 2 and re-
covery by a rescuer,' 8 both grounded in tort, the Court has applied con-
tractual principles in determining that the statute of limitations begins
to run from the time of sale.14 Since no persuasive reason exists to ex-
plain such seemingly varied results, uniformly applicable guidelines are
7 BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1758 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
8 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (McKinney 1964).
9 The common law rule of contract damages, first announced in Hadley v. Baxendale,
156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), is that damages are limited to those ordinarily and naturally
arising from the breach and in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
was made. J. CALAMAmR & J. PmULo, THE LAw OF CONTRACrs § 206 (1970). Where ap-
plicable, the remedy provided by the Uniform Commercial Code is somewhat broader.
See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-715 (McKinney 1964).
10 Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 NXE.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963), may represent the culmination of the extended breach of warranty action in
New York if strict products liability has, in fact, been adopted. See notes 20-26 and
accompanying text infra. The future of the extended breach of warranty action may be
limited to situations involving commercial loss as in Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 NXE.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (recovery allowed by
an indirect purchaser of textiles treated with defendant's chemicals who relied on the
latter's representations that the material would not shrink, thereby suffering pecuniary
loss).
11 See Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
12 Id.; Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
18 Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d
942 (1969).
14 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d
490 (1969), discussed in Symposium on Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 45
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 62 (1970).
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needed by the courts and the parties in instances where tort and con-
tract rules apparently overlap.
Strict products liability, also known as "enterprise liability," is a
parallel theory of recovery which directly recognizes the policy under-
lying the extended breach of warranty action, viz., to place the risk of
injury resulting from a defective product upon the industry which
markets it rather than upon the hapless victim. The industry, regardless
of fault, is thought to stand in a better position to absorb the loss and
spread its cost over the general public benefitting from the availability
of the product.15 By dispensing with the legal fictions and conceptual
inconsistencies surrounding extended breach of warranty, strict prod-
ucts liability achieves the goal first announced in 1912 that "the reme-
dies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the
intricacies of the law of sales."' 0
Since the extended breach of warranty action is a contract-tort
hybrid, and strict products liability pure tort,'7 the distinction between
the two is often muddled. This is especially true since both seek to pro-
tect the public without making the manufacturer an insurer. Con-
sequently, it has been asserted that strict products liability is merely the
final development of the extended breach of warranty action, the last
"vestiges of contract" having been removed.' Unhappily, the similari-
ties have, in the past, led the Court of Appeals to refer to "strict liability
in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity as merely differ-
ent ways of describing the very same cause of action."'19
The Court of Appeals attempted to clarify the law of products
liability in Codling v. Paglia.20 There, the Court promulgated several
requirements which, if satisfied, would allow anyone injured by a defec-
tive product to recover.21 Because the Court did not expressly denomin-
It See Murphy, New Directions in Products Liability, 612 INS. L.J. 40, 41 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Murphy].
10 Ketterer v. Armour S: Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); accord, PRossER, supra
note 3, at 656.
17 See PRSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment b at 349 (1965).
18 Murphy, supra note 15, at 45. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment
b at 348-49 (1965); PRossER, supra note 3, at 658; Comment, Strict Products Liability-Its
Application and Meaning, 21 Sw. LJ. 629 (1967).
19 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 253 N.E.2d 207, 210,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (1969).
20 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
21 The Court stated:
We accordingly hold that, under a doctrine of strict products liability, the manu-
facturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or damaged if the
defect was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury or damages; provided:
(1) that at the time of the occurrence the product is being used . . . in the
1974]
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ate its formula one of strict liability in tort, the question of whether
Codling intended to create such an independent cause of action in New
York or intended merely to refine existing warranty law has been sub-
ject to conflicting interpretation. 22 The better view of Codling is that it
recognized a separate cause of action in tort, labelled strict products
liability.2 3 A comparison of the Codling test with that formulated by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts24 for strict liability in tort would
manner normally intended, (2) that if the person injured... is himself the user
... he would not by the exercise of reasonable care have both discovered the
defect and perceived its danger, and (3) that by the exercise of reasonable care
the person injured... would not otherwise have averted his injury or damages.
Id. at 342, 298 NE.2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
22 The Court of Appeals in Codling did not emphatically declare that strict products
liability is now a separate cause of action in New York. The holding of the case, how-
ever, necessarily adopts the strict products liability elements, see note 25 infra, but leaves
open the more important question of whether or not the Codling action is pure tort or
still partly rooted in contract. In so doing, the Court followed a long established, if
seldom articulated, policy of progressing reticently in the products liability area. See
Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 191 N.E2.d 81, 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592, 595 (1963) ("However, for the present at least we do not think it necessary to so
extend this rule ... .'); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 200, 173 N.E.2d 773, 775-76,
213 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (1961) ("So convincing a showing ... calls upon us to move but we
should be cautious and take one step at a time.'); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217
N.Y. 383, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) ("This is as far as we are required to go for
the decision of this case.').
28 Indeed, the very same Court which decided Codling, six months later declared that
"strict product liability sounds in tort rather than in contract." Velez v. Craine & Clark
Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E.2d 750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973)
(per curiam). In Velez, the plaintiffs were injured when a rotten scaffold plank sold to their
employer by the defendant gave way under their weight. The plaintiffs proceeded against
the defendant lumber company on the theories of negligence and extended breach of
warranty. A claim based upon a theory of strict products liability, however, was not
asserted, as Codling v. Paglia was not decided until the case reached the appellate level.
The negligence count was dismissed at the close of the case. The jury found for the
plaintiffs on the breach of warranty count. On appeal, the defendant contended that
the plaintiffs' action was barred by the disclaimer running from the defendant to the
plaintiffs' employer. The Court held, on tort principles, that even though a disclaimer
of tort liability may be valid between contracting parties, it cannot bind strangers thereto.
The case was, however, remanded because the lower court's jury instructions were defec-
tive in light of Codling in that the jury had not been instructed that the plaintiffs could
recover only if, as users, they had used reasonable care to discover the defect and were
unable to prevent their injuries by the use of reasonable care.
24 The Restatement provides as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toars § 402A (1965).
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support this conclusion.25 Yet, argument may still be made that Codling
merely extended the breach of warranty action to bystanders without
creating a new cause of action. 26 Therefore, the question whether to
apply contract or tort principles under these circumstances has con-
tinued to pose problems.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in Rivera v. Berkeley
Super Wash, Inc., 27 recently adopted the position that Codling did, in
fact, recognize strict products liability as a separate cause of action.
There, injury occurred in 1967 when a safety lock on the hatch of an
extractor, a centrifugal laundry machine, failed to operate. The plain-
tiff, a small boy, lost his arm as a result of injuries sustained when he
reached into the rotating machine. The defendant had sold the extrac-
tor in 1959, eight years prior to the accident. In the action, commenced
in 1967, the complaint was initially grounded in negligence but was
later amended to include an action for breach of warranty. The trial
court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on the breach
of warranty action and granted plaintiff's request to further amend his
complaint to include a third cause of action in strict products liability.28
25 The following table illustrates a comparison of both tests:
Restatement Codling v. Paglia
When defective time of sale implies the same
Extent of defect "unreasonably dangerous "a substantial factor in
to user or consumer" bringing about his [any
person's] injury or dam-
age."
Manner of use ordinary and normal same suggested
manner
Contributory not a defense a limited defense, in that
negligence there is a duty on user (but
not a bystander) to use rea-
sonable care to discover de-
fect
Assumption of risk defeats recovery defeats recovery if by
reasonable care injury could
have been averted
Proper defendant seller manufacturer
The Restatement dearly provides that the defect must exist at the time of sale. The
Court of Appeals, in Codling, although ambiguous as to the time of the existence of such
defect, eliminated the possibility of a contrary inference by stating that "[t]he jury
properly found that Chrysler had produced an automobile with a defective steering
mechanism ..... " 32 N.Y.2d at 342-43, 298 N.E.2d at 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 470 (emphasis
added).
While it has often been said that contributory negligence cannot be a defense to a
strict liability action, certain forms of contributory negligence will bar recovery. See
Murphy, supra note 15, at 42.
26 See notes 18 & 19 supra.
27 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974).
28 Id. at 318-19, 354 N.YS.2d at 656-57.
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On appeal, the question was whether to apply the tort or contract
statute of limitations to the second and third causes of action. The
contract statute, six years under the CPLR,29 runs from the time of sale.
Applied in Rivera, the defendant's liability in warranty would have
expired two years prior to the accident. The tort statute of limitations,
three years under the CPLR,30 accrues at the time of the injury regard-
less of the date of sale of the defective product. Application of the tort
statute in Rivera, urged upon the court by the plaintiff, would have
made the action timely. Although the court dismissed the cause of ac-
tion in warranty as time-barred by contract rules, it found plaintiff's
argument persuasive and upheld the separate cause of action in strict
products liability as timely under tort principles.
The defendant had relied upon Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 31 which applied the contract statute of limitations to an extended
breach of warranty action. In so doing, the Mendel Court explicitly
refused to recognize strict products liability as a separate cause of ac-
tion.82 The Court found that the wording of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) bound a contracting party to the sales statute of limitations
regardless of the type of injury sustained. As a result, it was thought in-
appropriate to allow a stranger to the contract to enjoy a more favorable
statute of limitations than a contracting party. Additionally, Mendel
deemed Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.38 controlling. In Blessing-
ton, the Court granted plaintiffs the benefit of the longer contract
statute of limitations after their cause in negligence had expired. The
Mendel Court applied the same rationale despite the fact that imposing
the contract statute therein served to defeat an otherwise bona fide
claim.
Acting Presiding Justice Shapiro, writing for the majority in
Rivera, rejected the contention that there existed no separate cause of
action in strict products liability. The court distinguished the strict
28CPLR 213. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the statute of limitations govern-
ing sales is now four years. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964). However, this section
applies prospectively only to sales made after September 27, 1964, and, therefore, did not
apply in Rivera.
30 CPLR 214.
8125 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). In Mendel, the plaintiff
was injured when struck by a glass door seven years after the defendant manufacturer had
installed it. The plaintiff alleged negligence and breach of implied warranties. The
cause of action in warranty was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the warranty action was barred by the contract statute of
limitations.
32-Id. at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494. See text accompanying note 18
supra.
38 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
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products liability action, sounding in tort, from breach of warranty
under the UCC. The court felt the latter action was relevant only to
"the genuine breach of contract situation involving buyer and sell-
er .... ."34 In concluding that "on the operative facts in this record,
Mendel is no longer viable, '35 the Second Department limited Mendel
to the extended breach of warranty cause of action.
In so holding, the Rivera court took issue with Mendel's interpreta-
tion of the UCC and its construction of Blessington. While Mendel
found that the UCC statute of limitations36 was determinative, Rivera,
relying on language in the comments to another section of the Code37
and on the absence of directly controlling language in the Code itself,
took exception to the position that the UCC was intended to be an ex-
clusive remedy for products liability. In fact, the court found that the
UCC statute of limitations was, by its language, specifically directed at
the contract of sale, not at the collateral area of products liability in
tort.38 Furthermore, the court rejected the argument, asserted in Men-
del, that policy demanded application of the contract statute of limita-
tions to protect the manufacturer. The Rivera court noted that a cause
of action in negligence had always accrued at the time of injury and that
no undue hardship had resulted. 39 Finally, the court supported its de-
cision by stating:
It is clearly unjust to deny an injured party the possibility of com-
pensation on the wholly arbitrary basis of a lapse of a period of
time, the inception of which period of time is in no way connected
with him and the passage of which bears no relation to any laches
on his part.4 0
The court, having determined that the Codling-created action of
strict products liability was essentially one in tort, thus invested it with
34 44 App. Div. 2d at 324, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
35 Id. at 32, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 660. See also Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 344, 858
N.Y.S.2d 426 (2d Dep't 1974).
36 Section 2-725(2) states "a cause accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the
aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (McKinney 1964).
87 Comment 2 to section 2-318 of the UCO expressly states this section extends the
seller's warranty, express or implied, to all members of the buyer's household and does
not exclude any cause of action in negligence. N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-318, comment 2 (McKinney
1964). Additionally, comment 8 states that this section "is not intended to enlarge or
restrict" the extent to which the developing case law applies the seller's warranty to
other persons. Id. at comment 8.
38 44 App. Div. 2d at 324, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
39 Id. at 324, 354 N.YS.2d at 661.
40 Id. at 325, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 662. The court here echoes the words of Judge (now
Chief Judge) Breitel, dissenting in Mendel: "[1]t is all but unthinkable that a person
should be time-barred from prosecuting a cause of action before he ever had one." 25
N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E2d at 211, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
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a concomitant of the tort action - the personal injury statute of limita-
tions. Accordingly, plaintiff's action in strict products liability was up-
held as timely, having been commenced within three years of the in-
jury.41 The action for breach of warranty, however, was dismissed on
the ground that Mendel was still controlling authority for this action
until the Court of Appeals ruled otherwise.
It is anticipated that the Court of Appeals will consider Rivera in
the near future, and, by affirmance, solidify its adoption of strict
products liability.42 In situations similar to Rivera, where the sale has
occurred years before, or Codling, where the jury finds a defect but an
absence of negligence, the need is clearly demonstrated for an alterna-
tive cause of action in strict products liability. Rivera presents an ideal
opportunity for the Court of Appeals to lend much-needed clarity to
this area of the law.
CPLR 214(6): Cause of action for professional malpractice held to ac-
crue no later than the time of termination of parties' professional rela-
tionship.
Generally, a cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of
the wrongful acts or omissions of the professional.43 Applying this rule,
the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Sosnow v. Paul,44 dis-
missed a complaint for malpractice filed against two architects after the
three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(6) had expired.
The dismissal resulted despite the apparent inability of the nonpro-
fessional plaintiff to discover the negligence until the action was time-
barred.
41 Two judges dissented on the ground that Codling had not established a new cause
of action for strict liability and thus, they felt, Mendel was directly applicable. 44 App.
Div. 2d at 326-29, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 664-67.
42 Chief Judge Breitel, as evidenced by his dissent in Mendel, 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253
N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495, has long been an advocate of the recognition of strict
products liability in tort.
43See, e.g., Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 188 N.E.2d
142, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1963); Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein, 40 App. Div. 2d 100, 338
N.Y.S.2d 870 (1st Dep't 1972); Seger v. Cornwell, 44 Misc. 2d 994, 255 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1964).
Two exceptions to this rule exist. Where the negligence charged involves the leaving
of a foreign object in the body of a patient by a physician, the action does not accrue until
the patient could reasonably have discovered the injury. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen.
Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 45 STr. JOHN's L. REv. 500, 508 (1971). In addition, Borgia v. City of New York, 12
N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962), established the continuous treatment
doctrine, whereby the accrual of a malpractice cause of action is delayed until the services
of the physician for the same or related injuries terminate. Accord, O'Laughlin v. Sal-
amanca Hosp. Dist. Authority, 36 App. Div. 2d 51, 319 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1971).
44 48 App. Div. 2d 978, 852 N.Y.S.2d 502 (2d Dep't 1974).
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